Search results for "Moral psychology"

Smithian Sentimentalism Anticipated: Pufendorf on the Desire for Esteem and Moral Conduct

2018

In this paper, we argue that Samuel Pufendorf's works on natural law contain a sentimentalist theory of morality that is Smithian in its moral psychology. Pufendorf's account of how ordinary people make moral judgements and come to act sociably is surprisingly similar to Smith's. Both thinkers maintain that the human desire for esteem, manifested by resentment and gratitude, informs people of the content of central moral norms and can motivate them to act accordingly. Finally, we suggest that given Pufendorf's theory of socially imposed moral entities, he has all the resources for a sentimentalist theory of morality.

Relation between Social Conservatism, Moral Competence, Moral Orientations, and the Importance of Moral Foundations

2017

AbstractThis paper examines the relation between moral competence, moral orientations, importance of moral foundations, and political orientation, by combining two theoretical approaches in moral psychology--the cognitive perspective and social-intuitionist perspective. The participants (Study 1 N=348, aged 18 to 67, and Study 2 N = 361, aged 16 to 74) completed the Moral Competence Test (formerly Moral Judgment Test, Lind, 1978, 2008), the 30-Item Full Version of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2008), and measurements of political orientation (a seven-point self-evaluation scale in study 1 and an 8-item social conservatism scale in Study 2). There was a nega…

The pre-zygote identity as a moral issue.

2008

Introduction by the Editors

2015

Kohlberg’s approach to moral development and moral education continues to stimulate researchers and educators worldwide. His work still offers knowledge, methods and inspirations for understanding moral cognition and behavior, and how to foster it. This volume examines aspects of Kohlberg’s moral stage developmental theory and his theory of moral education to revisit their strengths and weaknesses in light of new questions and methods.

La conciencia moral desde una perspectiva neuroética. De Darwin a Kant

2017

The personal moral conscience is one of the keystones of moral life. Darwin went as far as to claim that this constitutes the most important difference between man and the lower animals. Yet the most relevant philosophical proposals of our times (Rawls, Habermas) do not expressly deal with this, perhaps because, as Aranguren said, they gave priority to intersubjective ethics over intrasubjective ethics. Without reconstructing that intrasubjective ethics, however, both personal and social life is watered down. In this work an attempt is made to explain what personal moral conscience consists of, what its neurobiological foundations are, and whether these are enough to explain its irreplaceab…

¿Naturalizar la idea de justicia? Una respuesta crítica desde la teoría moral de Jürgen Habermas

2017

The aim of this paper is to study critically, with the help of Habermas´s moral theory, the current naturalistic approach to morality —which is based on both the evolutionary theory and neuroscience—. In doing so it will be explained the specifically moral use of practical reason, as Habermas propose; it will be compared this moral use with Kohlberg's postconventional stage of moral development; and it will be claimed that naturalistic approach cannot explain this stage, that can be understood as specific justice area.

The Psycho-Biological Bases of Sports Supporters' Behaviour: The Virtuous Supporter

2012

Given current studies in moral psychology and following recent cases of wrong behaviour occurred in elite sporting events – e.g. the racist chants scandals in the English Premier League or the events following Mourinho's poke in the eye scandal – I shall analyse the extent to which supporters' brain make-up is determining them to behave in an ‘unfair way’. Yet this paper is not just a work on descriptive ethics, but a normative ethics work. Therefore, once I have developed the ‘psycho-biological account of sports supporters’, I shall explore whether or not a more virtuous account of sports supporting can be drawn. In order to fulfil this normative task I shall appeal to the concept of ‘fair…

Choice and Practical Reasoning in Ancient Philosophy

2013

Ancient thinkers acknowledged that we are the sort of creatures that want things to be a certain way and can make efforts for them to become that way. In that sense, the ancients had a notion of volition. But it is not clear how they conceived of volition. The problem is partly historical. Some late ancient, notably Christian thinkers came to regard volition in a different way than earlier thinkers had done, seeing reason as a less powerful ability than Socrates did, and instead placing their hopes on the will, which they regarded as a separate and sovereign part of the soul. About these historical developments there is much debate and little agreement. The problem is also partly conceptual…

Our Progress Towards Virtue

2015

This chapter is about how we can improve our rational abilities, i.e. make progress towards virtue. I first show that, according to Chrysippus, the natural properties of children are usually corrupted in three ways when they grow up and that adults therefore can make progress only by solving their inner conflicts, becoming more steadfast in their practical reasoning, and improving their self-understanding. So I argue that the main remedy against corruption is to study philosophy. I detail how we can acquire a better self-understanding by studying physics and how we can cure the mind of its inconsistencies by studying logic. I also argue that ethics prepares the mind for an active life in wh…

Etica della popolazione. Paradossi, intuizioni e metodo

2020

This paper is an introduction to the contemporary debate on population ethics. As it is shown at the beginning, the paradoxes of population ethics do not pose a problem just for Utilitarianism, but also for everyone who shares a set of very common intuitions. Different proposals for a solution are described, each of which proves ineffective. At the end of the paper two different methods of moral reasoning are distinguished depending on whether accepting counter-intuitive conclusions is allowed or not.